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Abstract 
With the use of arms trade data spanning the time period between 1992 and 2010, this thesis 
sets out to study what influence joining NATO has on a country’s volume of arms export and 
its probability of exporting arms. An assessment is also made of how NATO members trade 
arms. The data is estimated with a set of different gravity models and by using linear 
regressions evaluating volume and logistic regressions evaluating probability. The study finds 
that joining NATO has a negative influence both on the volume of arms exported by a 
country and the probability of the country exporting arms. Both exporter and importer being a 
member of NATO has a positive influence on the volume of export. It does however decrease 
the probability of arms being exported.  
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 3 
1 Introduction 
The Swedish debate on whether to join NATO has lately intensified. At the same time another 
hot topic current to Swedish politics, the nation’s arms export, has recently gained increased 
attention. For many years Sweden has been one of the largest arms exporters in the world. 
The arms industry of the country and a potential entrance into NATO both play significant 
roles in Swedish defense politics. This particular relationship gives grounds for closer 
examining what influence joining NATO has on the arms export of a country. More 
specifically the aim of this study is to investigate what impact joining NATO has on a 
country’s volume of arms export as well as the probability of the country exporting arms. 
Furthermore the study will investigate the arms trade pattern of NATO members. To what 
countries do NATO members export arms, and from where do NATO members import arms? 
Is trade more probable and are export volumes larger within the alliance as supposed to 
outside of it? 
 
By the use of extensive data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) a quantitative study is conducted. A gravity model forms the basis of the econometric 
approach to the question. The results are thereafter examined and interpreted from a general 
perspective. In a final discussion the findings are also applied to Sweden in order to evaluate 
what impact joining NATO more specifically would have on the Swedish arms industry.   
 
Section 2 continues by encompassing a description of the data, a review of the arms trade 
patterns of all NATO members and a brief background to the Swedish export of arms. Section 
3 discloses information regarding previous research while section 4 gives a theoretical 
foundation to the study. Section 5 describes the method used to examine the data. This part 
elaborates on the use of the gravity model and variables of the model. Section 6 presents as 
well as discusses the results. In the final conclusion of section 7 the results are put into the 
context of the Swedish arms export. This means evaluating the results while attributing 
attention to the political, economic and strategic aspects of Sweden and its arms export. 
Section 7 also treats all remaining remarks on the work such as areas in need of improvement 
and suggestions for future research.  
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2 Background 
2.1 Data 
This study uses data found in the Arms Transfer Database of the Swedish Institute for Peace 
and Research (SIPRI). The database encompasses all trades of major conventional weapons 
over the period 1950-2014. The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database does not include any trades of 
small arms. More specifically the database is compiled by eleven subcategories to the overall 
one being major conventional weapons (MCW). These categories are the following: aircraft, 
air defense systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, engines (for 
military aircraft, combat ships and most armored vehicles), missiles, sensors, satellites and 
other MCWs (mainly turrets for armored vehicles and ships). The valuation of each arms 
trade is a volume measure. This means that the prices noted in the dataset are not the actual 
prices paid by the receivers, but based on trend indicator values. This is expected to give more 
consistent data that is more comparable over time. The dataset has in other research been 
endorsed for its accuracy and reliability. Åkerman and Seim do in their article on arms trade, 
which uses the same database, communicate the reassurance of the high quality of the dataset 
given to them directly from representatives at SIPRI. These representatives explain that 
“since the rules and surveillance relating to arms are so strict and since equipment of this 
nature and size is difficult to hide from observation, the arms trade not captured by the dataset 
is negligible” (Åkerman & Seim, 2014, p.537).  
2.2 NATO and its trade of arms 
With the end of World War II began a new era in global politics. In order to avoid future wars 
ripping apart the continent and to deter the advancement of the Soviet Union, ten Western 
European countries, The United States and Canada signed a treaty in 1949. What was 
originally but an alliance treaty in which all parties, as is famously stated in the fifth article of 
the treaty, “agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all (NATO, 1949)” soon started to evolve 
into a closer military and political cooperation. In the following decades the organization 
expanded with several new members joining. The map in figure 1 illustrates how NATO has 
grown over the years.   
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Figure 1. The member states of NATO (CFR, 2015) 
 
NATO carries almost no military equipment of its own1. The alliance does instead work as a 
pooling system where members contribute with military equipment to the extent needed. This 
falls under a wider policy of interoperability, which by NATO itself is defined as, “the ability 
for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently.” Furthermore it states that, 
”Interoperability does not require common military equipment. What is important is that the 
equipment can share common facilities, and is able to interact, connect and communicate, 
exchange data and services with other equipment (NATO, 2012).” These statements clearly 
indicate that the trade of military equipment is a domestic business pertaining to each member 
state itself. The alliance does have requirements on how much a member must spend on its 
military defense. The 2% of GDP is however a requirement few members actually fulfill 
(World Bank, 2014). Albeit not all members spend the full 2% that is required, they still 
allocate funds to their military defense. A portion of those funds is used to purchase arms. But 
from where are these arms purchased? And those who produce, to whom do they sell? The 
charts in figure 2 & 3 have been compiled using data from the SIPRI Arms trade database. 
Accumulating and sorting all trades of each NATO member for those years every particular 
                                                      
1 The alliance itself only holds some radar aircraft systems (NATO, 2015) 
2 Although France abandoned the NATO-command between 1966 and 2009, it never officially left NATO and is 
thus in all calculations counted as a member of NATO since 1949.  
3  This list does not include India. The country is often cited as one of the biggest importers of Swedish arms in 
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member has been part of NATO carry out the calculations in figure 2 & 32. Division has also 
been made for trades taking place with the same country both prior to and after that country 
joined NATO as well. An example of this would be Portugal’s imports from Spain. All arms 
Portugal imported from Spain prior to 1982 (the year Spain joined NATO) are in the chart 
registered as Imports from other countries, while all imports from Spain after 1982 are 
registered as Imports from NATO members.  
 
The pie charts in figure 2 show the accumulated import and export of arms carried out by 
NATO members since the creation of the alliance. The pie charts in figure 3 incorporate data 
from a much narrower spectrum of time. 1999 is the year in which the first former Warsaw 
Pact states (The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) joined NATO. Several other have 
later followed. The charts in figure 3 do in other words illustrate the accumulated import and 
export of arms carried out by NATO members since its eastern expansion started in 1999.  
 
 
Figure 2. Total NATO imports and exports of arms 1950-2014 
 
 
Figure 3. Total NATO imports and exports of arms 1999-2014 
 
                                                      
2 Although France abandoned the NATO-command between 1966 and 2009, it never officially left NATO and is 
thus in all calculations counted as a member of NATO since 1949.  
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By looking at the charts it becomes evident that a large portion of arms imported by NATO 
members originates from other member states. In contrast stand the charts representing export 
of arms from NATO members. In these only about one third of all arms exported go to other 
NATO members. There seems to be a preference of importing arms from fellow members 
while seemingly no particular regard is taken to if an importer of arms is a NATO member or 
not. When comparing the imports and exports of NATO members for the two time periods 
measured, it is noticeable that imports from other countries more than double from 6% (1950-
2014) to 15% (1999-2014). The share of arms exports to other countries also increases, albeit 
only with a slight 5% from 68% (1950-2014) to 72% (1992-2014). Both changes suggest an 
increasingly globalized arms trade network where importers and exporters are less clustered 
to allies. This finds support in the work of Åkerman and Seim that is discussed in the section 
of previous research. The large portion of arms exported from NATO members to non-
members may seem remarkable. It does however receive some explanation in figure 4. The 
pie chart illustrates the largest exporters of arms in the world during the post-Cold War era. 
Members of NATO (bold) make out almost 67% of the global exports of arms. In other words 
it is quite logical that importers, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not, will 
be purchasing a fair share of their arms from NATO members. Similarly the large arms 
exporting NATO members meet a demand, and perhaps are in need of demand, that exceeds 
the accumulated demand of their allies. Consequently such a great portion of NATO member 
arms exports go to countries outside of the alliance.   
 
 
Figure 4. The 15 largest exporters of arms, 1992-2014 
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A closer examination of who these other countries are shows a large presence of allies to the 
United States. The largest importer of arms from NATO is South Korea at 7% of total NATO 
member exports. The country is a close regional ally of the United States. Saudi Arabia 
follows closely at second place with 6,6% of exports. Albeit not at all as close of an ally to 
the United States as South Korea, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the military strategic 
presence of the United States in the Middle East. One way of exercising this presence is 
through arms trade (SUSRIS, 2010).  
 
Figure 5. The 20 largest importers of arms from NATO members, 1992-2014 
 
Japan is another noticeable ally of the United States that places high on the list of the largest 
importers of NATO member exported arms. Given the fact that the United States holds a 
central role within the alliance and makes out about 40% of global arms exports, it is quite 
logical that a large share of the arms being exported to countries outside of NATO by NATO 
members are closely tied to the United States.  
 
The aim of this study is mainly, as aforementioned, to examine the impact that joining NATO 
has on the arms export volumes of a country. An indicative, yet simple, way of examining 
this is by looking at how arms export volumes have changed for those countries that have 
joined NATO since the end of the Cold War. The two graphs in figure 6 and 7 show the 
average volume of arms exported by all post-Cold War entrants. To avoid distortion of the 
graphs between the group entering NATO in 1999 and the group entering in 2004, these two 
have instead been divided. The volume on the y-axis is denoted in million US$ at 1990 
constant prices while the x-axis values are years. 
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Figure 6. Average annual volume of arms exports for NATO members who joined in 1999 
 
 
Figure 7. Average annual volume of arms exports for NATO members who joined in 2004 
 
The trend for the 1999 group is quite a substantial decline in the export of arms since joining 
NATO. The group joining in 2004 experiences a very slight, positive trend. Arms trade deals 
tend to be a very lengthy and extensive process. This creates a certain degree of lag between 
the initiation of negotiations and an actual transaction. To smaller producers, like all those 
incorporated into the chart data, one large purchase may heavily affect the total volume of 
exports for that year. Both of these effects may blur the true image of the impact that joining 
NATO has had on the countries’ arms export volumes. Nevertheless the overall impression of 
the two graphs leads to believe that joining NATO has a negative impact on a country’s arms 
export volumes.  
 
The likelihood of a country exporting arms can to some extent be reflected in the occurrence 
of individual exports of arms. The higher the current occurrence, the more likely the country 
is of exporting arms in the future. This can be briefly explained as a result of the extensive 
0	  50	  
100	  150	  
200	  250	  
300	  350	  
1999	   2002	   2005	   2008	   2011	   2014	  
0	  20	  
40	  60	  
80	  100	  
120	  140	  
2004	   2007	   2010	   2013	  
 10 
initial costs of producing arms and the intricacies of sovereign state arms purchases. These 
create large entry barriers for new actors. Both of the observed groups have a negatively 
sloping trend line for the number of individual arms exports per year during the time period 
they have been NATO members. This indicates a decreased likelihood of exporting arms due 
to having joined NATO.  
 
 
Figure 8. Average annual number of arms exports for NATO members who joined in 1999 
 
 
Figure 9. Average annual number of arms exports for NATO members who joined in 2004 
 
The graphs are but simple observations of trends occurring within the arms export sector of a 
set of NATO members. They do however give an indication of what tendencies are to be 
expected in the econometric investigation.  
 
2.3 The Swedish arms export 
By entering the Cold War neutral, and remaining so throughout the whole course of it, 
Sweden saw it necessary that its military defense was as independent as its politics. Relying 
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on any other nation for the supply of military equipment was considered unreliable and to 
some extent in conflict with the established neutrality. As a result the arms industry received 
large funding and support from the government. With the end of the Cold War much of the 
incentive for high military spending evaporated.  
 
 
Figure 10. Sweden’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1992-2012 
(Försvarsmakten, 2014) 
 
The constantly decreasing Swedish military expenditure should as a natural consequence have 
taken its toll on the Swedish arms industry. This does however not hold true. The diagram in 
figure 11 illustrates the value of Sweden’s total export of arms for every year between 1992 
and 2014. The export is denominated in US$ million at constant (1990) prices.  
 
 
Figure 11. Sweden’s arms export 1992-2014 
 
The trend line clearly shows how the Swedish arms industry steadily has increased its exports 
since 1992. This has happened simultaneous to a trend of decreasing governmental spending 
on the very same industry. Combining the two facts, one can assume that as governmental 
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investments decreased, capital was instead injected into the industry through an increased 
export of arms. In other words: the arms export started to substitute Swedish military 
expenditure (Tuvestad, 2014). This is a good example of how the production costs of 
domestic arms are supported by arms export. Although the Swedish producers of arms are 
privately held companies, the Swedish arms export is no free market, open to any buyer or 
seller. The government does according to paragraph 6 in the law on military equipment 
(Sveriges Riksdag, 1992) wield absolute power in the decision of what countries Swedish 
companies may sell arms to. Figure 12 shows the countries to which Sweden has exported 
arms since 1992.  
 
Figure 12. Importers of Swedish arms, 1992-2014 
 
Importers include most of Europe, large parts of the Americas, parts of the Middle East as 
well as a handful of nations in South and East Asia, Oceania and Africa.  
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Figure 13. The 20 largest importers of Swedish military equipment 1992-20143 
 
The Swedish law states that the country only gives license to the export of arms as long as 
“there exists security and defense reasons and if it does not conflict with Sweden’s foreign 
policy”. Moreover all decisions regarding licensing of arms export have to follow the 
guidelines of the EU. These prohibit arms from being sold to countries that violate human 
rights and/or are involved in an armed conflict.  
3 Previous research 
Previous studies specifically addressing empirical observations made on the economic aspects 
of arms trade are somewhat scarce. It is suggested by García-Alonso and Levine (2007) that 
this is due to the complexity of the arms trade market as well as the difficulty of finding 
reliable and well defined data that captures all aspects of the market. As they point out in their 
work a large challenge to making any predictions about the market is the difficulty of 
quantifying national or regional security (alternatively insecurity) – a determining factor of 
demand.  
 
What the writers consistently point out in their paper, and that cannot be stressed enough, is 
the many ways in which the arms trade market is fundamentally different from other markets. 
An explicit example of this is the skewed market preferences caused by the negative 
insecurity externality of arms. The more arms possessed by the world, the more insecure 
countries will feel. Consumers on the arms market may therefore enjoy higher utility from 
producer monopoly or the forming of cartels – something that would, in accordance with 
basic microeconomic theory, mean lowered output and increased prices. Exporters of arms 
are free to engage in any such formation since arms trade is exempt from WTO rules. In other 
words exporting countries may set any trade policies they find maximize their own objectives.  
 
Much of this essay’s empirical approach is based on the work of Åkerman and Seim (2014). 
Their extensive work examining the global arms trade network from 1950 until 2007 is a very 
suitable foundation. The two authors set out to investigate if countries tend to trade arms with 
other countries in their own political vicinity. More specifically they look at how countries 
with different polities trade arms. To their aid they also use the SIPRI arms trade database. In 
                                                      
3  This list does not include India. The country is often cited as one of the biggest importers of Swedish arms in 
recent years. SIPRI’s database (upon which the list is based) does however not include artillery under 100 mm 
caliber, support equipment, components and technology – some of which is what India purchased from Sweden. 
(Regeringen, 2013). 
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addition they use polity scores from the POLITY IV database hosted by the Center for 
Systematic Peace and George Mason University. Åkerman and Seim also look at how the 
global arms trade network has changed over time and document the key differences between 
the arms trade networks of NATO and the Warsaw-pact. In parts of the study they divide 
results into a Cold War and a post-Cold War section. This is to contrast the two against each 
other and see if the polity preferences of arms exporting governments are different between 
the two eras. The part of their article most significant to this study is their method of 
estimating differences in polity scores and their influence on arms exports. A similar gravity 
model is used. The independent variable of their equation is a dummy variable assuming the 
value 1 if country i exported arms to country j at point t in time and 0 otherwise. Essentially 
the same set of independent variables is used except the NATO variables that are specific to 
this study. All the variables are explained in the method section of the essay. Calculating the 
difference in polity score between the exporter and importer derives the relative polity score. 
The difference is then squared to achieve a positive value. This score is also modified to serve 
some of the other areas studied in their article. These are however not of relevance to this 
investigation. Their equation is regressed with a pooled OLS.  
 
What Åkerman and Seim find is that the global arms trade network of the Cold War era had a 
clear division between East and West. These two sub-networks were quite centralized, the 
Warsaw Pact being the more centralized. In the post-Cold War era the global arms trade 
network has grown more clustered and decentralized. As for the polity preferences, a clear 
negative relationship between differences in polity and arms traded is noted for the Cold War 
era. The further apart two countries were in polity, the less likely they were of trading arms. 
The same relationship cannot be detected for the post-Cold War era. This is corroborated by 
their observations of the global arms trade network having grown more clustered in recent 
years.  
4 Theory 
Concerns for internal as well as external threats are what create the demand for arms. The 
threat of having to engage in an armed conflict is however not solemnly what drives the 
demand. The possession of arms also emits a general posture of power (Levine et al., 1997). 
A heavy possession of arms could therefore also be seen as a preventive measure. It is less 
likely to be involved in an armed conflict if antagonists evaluate an attack to be costly. A 
predicament faced by every nation though is the security dilemma. A scholar named J.H. Herz 
was first to use this term in 1950. Herz wrote that the security dilemma was "A structural 
notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, 
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regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own 
measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz, 1950)." The 
skewed microeconomic preferences brought up in the section of previous research addresses 
this matter. The research suggests that because the general existence of arms in the hands of 
one nation creates a negative utility for other nations, minimizing the existence of arms 
therefore optimizes the accumulated utility of the world. Consumers will hence prefer less of 
a supply at a higher cost, since this will decrease the risk of other nations possessing arms. 
Such a market is achieved through monopoly or oligopoly. The forces of such a market will 
as a result have larger exporters eventually outcompete smaller exporters.  
 
Most countries need to import Major Conventional Weapons while a small group of countries 
has the capability of producing them. In their work Levine et al. (1997) create a Cobb-
Douglas utility function that seeks to quantify an arms exporting country’s perception of its 
own security. While their particular study aims at creating an equilibrium model for the 
global arms trade network, the utility function still serves to gain better understanding of 
some of the mechanism at force in this study. 
 
1. 𝑆 = 𝑆!!!!𝑆!! 
 
The function describes the national security (𝑆) of an arms exporting nation. This security is 
defined by domestic security (𝑆!) and regional security (𝑆!). The exponent 𝜇 is the weight 
attached to regional security, assuming any value between 0 and 1. In the case of 0 the 
exporting country has no regard for repercussions in regional security due to its exports. 
Instead it exports on free market terms with the aim of maximizing profit. This is however not 
a very likely scenario. Many of the largest exporters are global dominant players. It is 
consequently in their interest not to export too much arms to any specific country or region. 
This could impair their own capability of intervening in a regional conflict. By joining NATO 
two things happen to the military strategic positioning of a country. Through the binding 
agreements of the alliance the country is assured of receiving military assistance. At the same 
time the country complies to share the defense burden carried by other, possibly, remote 
nations. In other words what the alliance effectively does is a pooling of national security, 
through sharing national defense. Putting this into the context of equation 1, joining the 
alliance means merging with a general NATO security.  
 
2. 𝑆!"#$ = 𝑆!_!"#$!!! 𝑆!_!"#$!  
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The total security of NATO is a cumulated value of all members’ domestic and regional 
security. The reasons for bringing this up is to underline the fact that ones a country joins 
NATO it will start complying with much of the military strategic policies of the alliance. 
These policies could have other preferences for domestic security (𝑆!!!! ≠ 𝑆!_!"#$!!! )  and 
regional security (𝑆!! ≠ 𝑆!_!"#$! ). That could put constraints on the arms export policy of the 
joining country.  
 
Every nation with an arms industry has, at least at some point in time, decided to create it due 
to defense reasons. A domestic supply of arms ensures a constant supply of arms even in the 
case of a conflict. But the more advanced the arms technology becomes, the more expensive 
the development costs are. This is most commonly what drives the initial decision of starting 
to export arms, an otherwise, on national level, not very desirable choice (due to the security 
dilemma). When a country joins NATO it aligns itself with a large percentage of the worlds 
arms producers. The risk of lacking arms in case of an intrastate conflict naturally decreases. 
This consequently diminishes a strong argument for the domestic production of arms, the 
result potentially being less domestic production and less export of arms from that country. It 
is moreover plausible that the country will receive beneficial offers on arms purchases from 
allies. To these allies exporting arms to other NATO members does not necessarily result in a 
negative externality (as would otherwise be the case). Exporting arms to an ally increases the 
military capability of the ally and adds to the accumulated capability of the alliance. Exports 
within NATO therefore ought to generate a positive externality to other members. Bolstering 
the national security of one member means bolstering the security of the entire alliance.  
 
5 Method 
The empirical study of the data has been conducted by using the gravity model. Jan Tinberg 
was in 1962 the first one to apply the gravity model to trade flow analysis. The name is an 
analogy with Newton’s model on gravity. Both predict that the larger the mass of two objects 
and the closer they are located to each other, the more they gravitate towards each other. In 
terms of trade, gravitate does in the analogy signify volume of trade and mass is measured in 
GDP and GDP per capita. Larger economies situated closer to each other are thus predicted to 
trade more. Economic size was not accounted for neither in the Heckscher-Ohlin model nor 
the Ricardian model – two prominent models of international trade at the time of Tinberg’s 
gravity model implementation. These did instead place focus on differences in technology 
and factor endowments respectively. The gravity model was initially criticized for lacking 
theoretical basis, but has over the years, with contributory theoretical amendments (such as 
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Anderson and van Wincoop’s paper on relative trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003)), evolved to become one of the most widely used and recognized models when 
assessing and forecasting different patterns of trade. The formal gravity model is expressed as 
follows: 
 
3. ln𝑀!"# = 𝛽! + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" + 𝛽!ln𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡!" +𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦!" + 𝜀!"# 
 
The model (as is the case in equation 3) is most often log-linearized. This means converting 
the equation into a linear equation by taking the natural logarithm of both sides. Several of the 
variables increase at an exponential rate. The conversion simplifies the use of the econometric 
method ordinary least squares (OLS) and does also in general render the results much easier 
to interpret. The equation can be broken down into dependent and independent variables as 
well as constants. ln𝑀 is the only dependent variable of the equation and represents the 
logarithmic value of exports from country i to country j at point t in time. 𝛽! is the constant at 
which the equation crosses the x-axis. ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" and ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" are the logarithmic values of the 
GDP of the exporting and the importing country. ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" and ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" are similar to the 
previous two variables, but with the difference of GDP now being presented as per capita. All 
of the four GDP-variables relate to the mass of the exporting and importing country. A greater 
economy has a greater accumulated demand for goods, meaning more goods will tend to be 
demanded from exporting country i. The higher the GDP per capita of the importer, the 
higher will also the average demand of each citizen be. This is a way of accounting for how 
rich the countries are and not simply the accumulated size of the economy, regardless of 
wealth. The GDP and GDP per capita of the exporter is a proxy for the demand on the goods 
sold by the country. Assuming high GDP and GDP per capita means the exporter has goods 
in high demand by the rest of the world, this should consequently increase export volumes. 
The theory predicts that the values of all the four variables will at increase also increase trade. 
This leads to the hypothesis for this study that all four variables relating to GDP will have 
positive coefficients, in other words a positive impact on trade.  
 ln𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡!" is the logarithmic geographical distance between the exporter and the importer. In 
physics the gravitational pull of two bodies decreases simply due to the fact that they are 
further apart. Distance in the gravity model is however an expression for different trade 
barriers. These tend to become larger and larger the further two economies are from each 
other. Of course the mere distance plays a role. Shipping cost increase the farther two 
countries are from each other. But with distance other barriers such as culture, historical 
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heritage and linguistic differences tend to increase. 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if two countries share borders and 0 otherwise. The feature of sharing borders can be 
seen as an extension to the concept of distance. By sharing a border, two countries are not 
only very close to each other, but they even make physical contact. With this comes lower 
trade barriers as shipment costs decrease, the chance of historical and linguistic ties increase 
and citizens of the two countries are more likely to come in contact with products from the 
other country. They may even commonly cross the border for work or personal relations. All 
of these are factors that increase trade. 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the same language is shared by the exporter and the importer, whilst 0 otherwise. Once more 
trade barriers are at target. Sharing the same language simplifies communication and will 
naturally increase the likelihood, thus also volume, of trade occurring. The comfort of calling 
somebody over the phone and negotiating in ones native language as suppose to English or 
another language is indisputable. 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦!" is quite a curious dummy variable that also relates 
to distance and trade barriers. Many colonies (current or historic) are by geographical distance 
located far from the colonizing country. Simply accounting for the distance variable would in 
this case therefore suggest less trade than is probably true. The cultural, many times linguistic 
and perhaps judicial ties binding a historic or current colony with its colonizer tend to 
decrease trade barriers that would otherwise have been present. The variable 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦!" (taking 
the value 1 if exporter and importer have a shared colonial past) accounts for these effects 
created by the colonial ties. The gravity model predicts that the less the distance between two 
countries, the more they will trade. A more refined way of saying it would be that the smaller 
the trade barriers, the more two countries trade. This leads to the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of ln𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡!", 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" , 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦!" will all have a positive value, 
hence a positive value on trade volume.  
 
In order to assess the particular question posed by this study, the gravity model needs some 
alterations. In equation 3 the dependent variable was the logarithmic value of all exports from 
country i (exporter) to country j (importer) at point t (year) in time. Since this study 
investigates volumes of arms export, the dependent variable ln𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝!"# in equation 4 is 
only the volume of arms exported from country i to country j at point t in time. This modified 
equation has also been equipped with an additional dummy variable. 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# takes the value 
1 if the exporting country is a member of NATO at poinst t in time and 0 if not. Since the 
dataset is comprised of observations of the same country pairs but for different years, a 
change of 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# from 0 to 1 (the exporting country joins NATO) is expected to capture the 
impact that joining NATO has had on the arms export of the exporting country. The 
theoretical background discussed in the theory section suggests that by joining NATO many 
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of the primary incentives for maintaining a domestic arms industry evaporate. This does in 
consequence eliminate the, by the theory stated, primary reason for arms export – namely to 
spread the fixed cost needed to sustain a competitive domestic industry. The hypothesis is 
therefore that by joining NATO an arms producing country will decrease its exports.  
 𝜇!" and 𝜆! represent the bilateral and time fixed effects used in the equation. These are given 
detailed attention further into the method section.  𝜀!"# is the error term. 
 
4. ln𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝!"# = 𝛽! + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" + 𝛽!ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐!" + 𝛽!ln𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡!" +𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦!" + 𝛽!"𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑝𝑜𝑙!"# + 𝛽!!𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# + 𝜇!" + 𝜆! + 𝜀!"# 
 
New to this equation is also the variable 𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑝𝑜𝑙!"#. It describes how far apart the polities are 
of exporting country i and importing country j. The relative polity score is estimated by using 
the following equation: 
 
5. 𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑝𝑜𝑙!"# = (𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" − 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!")! 
 
This variable is used to account for some of the preferences countries have of trading with 
other countries of the same or similar polity (Åkerman & Seim, 2014, p.541). Åkerman and 
Seim have in their work already concluded that similar polities have a positive impact on 
arms trade, giving strong reason to believe that the variable will have a positive coefficient 
also in this study.  
 
The econometric study does not only investigate the impact that joining NATO has on the 
volumes of arms exported by a country. It also estimates the impact that joining NATO has 
on the very probability of the same country exporting arms. To estimate the impact that 
joining NATO has on the probability of a country exporting arms, the dependent variable ln𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝!"#  is switched to a dummy variable named Dummy_𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝!"# . This dummy 
variable takes the value 1 if trade occurred between country i and country j at point t in time. 
If not it equals zero. What this means is essentially having a dependent variable for each 
observation saying if “arms are exported” is a true or false claim. The probability of exporting 
arms is considered to be closely related to the volume a country exports. Since the arms 
industry is so costly and arms deals tend to be few and large as suppose to many and small, it 
is likely that the probability of arms export will follow the same pattern as the volume of arms 
export when a country joins NATO. Therefore the hypothesis is that the probability of 
exporting arms will decrease as a country joins NATO.  
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Additional estimations of volume impact and probability impact are also made, but now 
accounting for both the exporter and the importer being a member of NATO. When volume 
impact and probability impact is estimated with both the exporter and the importer being part 
of NATO, the dependent variables are the same as when only the exporter membership status 
is accounted for. The variable 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# does however change. It is now switched to the 
dummy variable 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#$ , which takes the value 1 if both exporter and importer is a 
member of NATO at point t in time and otherwise it 0 is. Observing how Dummy_𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝!"! 
and 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#$  relate to each other gives an estimate of how both the exporter and the 
importer being a NATO member influences the arms export frequency. From this an estimate 
of likelihood of arms export can be derived. The theory section brings up the security 
dilemma, namely that any country’s possession of arms is a negative externality to all other 
countries. Exporters therefore ought to be reluctant of exporting weapons due to this negative 
externality. Joining NATO will however diminish some of the negative externality since 
some importers will now be part of the same alliance. That means exporting arms to allies is 
in effect an indirect way of improving the military defense of the exporter. In a way it can be 
considered removing part of a trade barrier. The hypothesis is therefore that both exporter and 
importer being part of NATO has a positive impact on the volume of arms export. Joining 
NATO does however decrease the incentives for a country to maintain a domestic arms 
industry and in consequence an arms export industry. Only the very largest of arms exporting 
NATO members continue with their arms production. Most NATO members will therefore 
not be exporting arms to each other, but rather import from the few large producers in the 
alliance. This leads to the hypothesis that both exporter and importer being part of NATO 
decreases the likelihood of arms export occurring.  
 
The two types of regressions applied to the equations are ordinary least squares (OLS) and a 
logistic regression. The reason for using two different types of regressions are the natures of 
the dependent variables and the answers intended to be found in the results. OLS is a 
statistical technique that fits equations with dependent variables that have a continuous value. 
What OLS does is draw a line through the set of data points that minimizes the sum of 
squared distances to all the different data points. Simply speaking it is a way of constructing a 
line of best fit. By looking at the values the OLS regression assigns to the coefficients of 
variables 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# and 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#$, a prediction can be made about what impact they have on 
the trajectory of the line, thus also the impact on the value assumed by the dependent arms 
export variable.  
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A binomial logistic regression better fits the equations expressing probability. These 
equations do not have a continuous value for their dependent variable. It is instead a dummy 
variable that equals 1 or 0 depending on whether arms are exported from i to j at point t in 
time (1 if true). The dependent variable of the equations is hence called binomial. A logistic 
regression can also be used on equations with dependent variables ranging other values than 0 
and 1. These are called multinomial logistic regressions. This study only uses equations with 
a binomial dependent variable. Henceforth logistic regression therefore only refers to a 
binomial logistic regression.  
 
So why use a logistic regression? Well, the OLS regression is linear and will project a line of 
best fit through the data points. But if the data points only hold the value 0 or 1, a straight line 
through the dataset would cross the line of points valued at 0 and the line of points valued at 
1. The OLS would give a trajectory that can assume values beyond the scope of the dataset, 
which is impossible since the values reflect a yes/no question. Further confusion to the linear 
model is the fact that the residuals are not normally distributed, but clustered around 1 and 0. 
Using the logistic model adjusts for this and does instead create an approximated equation 
that converges towards 0 and 1 in the ends. Figure 14 gives a graphic viewing that clarifies 
the benefit of using the logistic model. 
 
 
Figure 14. Graphic illustration of a logistic and a linear regression with a binomial variable 
 
The equation of the logistic curve seen in the figure can be transformed back into a linear 
equation by taking its logarithm.  
 
6. 𝑙𝑛 !!!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥 
 
In difference to an ordinary linear equation, the dependent variable consists of a logged odds 
for the probability of the variable assuming one value (𝑝) divided by the probability of 
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assuming the other value (1 − 𝑝). The coefficients estimated for each independent variable do 
not, as with the OLS, directly state what impact they have on the value of the dependent 
variable. Instead they state the impact they have on the logged odds of the independent 
variable being affirmative (equaling 1). So in the particular case of arms trade, the 
coefficients of 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"# and 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#$  in the logistic regression indicate how much more 
likely country i is of exporting arms to country j at point t in time if country i is a member of 
NATO (𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#) or if both are members of NATO (𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂!"#$). 
 
The data is so called panel data, meaning it measures a set of entities over time. In this case it 
observes the entity of country pairs and how arms are exported from i to j during a certain 
time period. Because of this a bilateral fixed effect (𝜇!") and a time fixed effect (𝜆!) is added 
to all of the regressions. This allows for different groups of observations (in this case country-
pairs and years) to have different intercepts. It functions as a control for unobserved time and 
bilateral effects. An otherwise lingering issue is the risk of omitting external effects, thus 
creating a bias in the data. An example of this could be a large financial crisis. Since the same 
entities are observed over time, the data would pick up a heavy drop in trade between 
countries. The risk could be of this coinciding with change in some other variable within the 
model. A crisis in 2004 could for example heavily have impacted world economy and 
resulted in a global slump in trade. Without a time fixed effect this slump in trade (including 
arms trade) could in the data set have been estimated as a result of joining NATO for those 
joining in 2004. Reality is however that this was an effect of the financial crisis and is not 
related to factors accounted for within the model. Yet without a time fixed effect, the model 
would include the large macroeconomic effects of the financial crisis and consequently distort 
the results. The bilateral fixed effect accounts for unobserved time-invariant differences for 
each country-pair. This captures the omitted variables that are specific to each pair and do not 
change over time. This could be proximity between the capitals or a presence of a 
geographical obstacle like mountains, which in the model just would be expressed as border 
and nothing else. Omitted variable bias is when a variable that should be accounted for is not. 
 
In an effort to minimize the impact of some undesirable statistical effects, a robustness test is 
included in all of the regressions. There are several different tests used to ensure the statistics 
to be robust. In this case the Huber-White sandwich estimator has been used. It is a robust 
option for estimating standard errors. The robust standard errors generated by the test can deal 
with a collection of statistical concerns such as heteroskedasticity or that some observations 
exhibit large residuals, leverage or influence.  
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Complimentary sources merged to the data set of arms export come from different sources. 
Data on GDP and GDP per capita comes from Penn World Tables. Data on distance between 
countries, common language, common borders and common colonization history comes from 
Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et Informations Internationales (CEPIIs). The polity score data 
is retrieved from the POLITY IV database hosted by the Center for Systematic Peace and 
George Mason University. 
 
The SIPRI arms trade database spans data from 1950 to 2014. The regressions are however 
run on data for the time period 1992 to 2010. Constraints in the dataset of GDP and GDP per 
capita is what rendered the years after 2010 not to be included in the dataset. The year 1992 is 
chosen as t=1 because it is the first year after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This 
study aims at examining what impact joining NATO has on a country’s arm export today. The 
arms trade pattern of the world has undergone large change since the Cold War. Figure 15 
and 16 illustrate this change. The trade of today is much more clustered than it was during the 
Cold War. One reason for this is the clear bipolar character of world politics during the Cold 
War. Including years when the Soviet Union was still in existence would not be a true 
reflection of the trade pattern of today and would distort the results. 
 
 
Fig. 15. The global arms trade network, 1970-1974 (Åkerman & Seim, 2014) 
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Fig. 16. The global arms trade network, 2000-2004 (Åkerman & Seim, 2014) 
 
6 Results 
The results from estimating volume of export with OLS and probability of export with a logit 
model are displayed in table 1. Volume 1 includes an independent dummy variable 
accounting for whether the exporter is a member of NATO at the point of exports. Volume 2 
includes an independent dummy variable accounting for whether both exporter and importer 
is a member of NATO at the point of exports. Probability 1 includes the same independent 
variables as volume 1 but uses the binary dependent variable expressing export or no export. 
Probability 2 has the same independent variables as volume 2 and the same dependent 
variable as probability 1. The number of observations is significantly different between the 
volume and the probability results. This has in general rendered the results of probability a 
higher level of statistical significance.  
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Table 1. Regression results 
 
Variable	   Volume	  1	   Volume	  2	   Probability	  1	   Probability	  2	  lnGDPit   0,289***	   0,261***	   0,796***	   0,8***	     (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  lnGDPjt   0,28***	   0,279***	   0,445***	   0,45***	     (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  lnGDPpcit   -­‐0,225***	   -­‐0,276***	   0,694***	   0,696***	     (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  lnGDPpcjt   0,024	   0,018	   0,023	   0,04***	     (0,247)	   (0,397)	   (0,122)	   (0,008)	  lnDistij   0,065*	   0,088***	   -­‐0,44***	   -­‐0,485***	     (0,056)	   (0,010)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  Borderij   0,121	   0,148*	   -­‐0,068	   -­‐0,098	     (0,126)	   (0,060)	   (0,330)	   (0,155)	  Languageij   -­‐0,061	   -­‐0,042	   0,02	   -­‐0,009	     (0,425)	   (0,591)	   (0,647)	   (0,847)	  Colonyij   0,176*	   0,156*	   0,486***	   0,474***	     (0,055)	   (0,083)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  Rel_polijt   0,001***	   0,001***	   -­‐0,002***	   -­‐0,002***	     (0,008)	   (0,005)	   (0,000)	   (0,000)	  NATOEXP   -­‐0,154***	   -­‐	   -­‐0,076**	   -­‐	     (0,001)	   (-­‐)	   (0,021)	   (-­‐)	  NATOBOTH   -­‐	   0,111**	   -­‐	   -­‐0,337***	  
	  
(-­‐)	   (0,022)	   (-­‐)	   (0,000)	  
Time	  effects	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Bilateral	  effects	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Observations	   5824	   5824	   458	  026	   458	  026	  
R2	   0,165	   -­‐	   0,164	   -­‐	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   -­‐	   0,36	   -­‐	   0,36	  
Notes: The P-value is noted within parenthesis below the corresponding coefficient value. The asterisks note 
significance at the following confidence levels: *** means significance at the 1% level, ** means significance at 
the 5% level and * means significance at the 10% level. Export volumes have been regressed with OLS while 
probability of export has been regressed with a logistic regression.  
 
The results across all four regressions suggest that both the probability and volume of export 
increase with the increase of GDP and GDP per capita. This confirms the hypothesis. The 
only results diverging from this are the volume 1 & 2 GDP per capita coefficients of the 
exporting country. These estimate a negative coefficient for the two variables. The probability 
of export increases with a decrease in distance between the exporter and importer. The 
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hypothesis is confirmed. The volume of export does on the contrary though, according to 
volume 1 & 2, have a positive relationship with distance. This means the farther away the 
exporter and importer are from each other, the greater the volumes of export, thus refuting the 
hypothesis. In volume 1 this result is only significant at the 10% level, which is rather poor. 
The result in volume 2 is however significant at the 1% level, which gives it much more 
credibility. A partial explanation to this could be the relatively remote location of the United 
States. The impact of the country is rather large on the data, given it accounts for about 40% 
of global arms exports. Neither border nor common language generates any results of 
significance. The results suggest that a colonial past does, in line with the hypothesis, increase 
both the volume and the probability of arms export. All the results for relative polity are 
significant at a 1% level but are negligible in impact.  
 
Turning to the main variables of interest, results from volume 1 and probability 1 suggest 
that joining NATO will decrease the volume as well as the probability of a country’s arms 
export. The results in volume 1 are significant at the 1% level while the results in probability 
1 are significant at the 5% level. This gives both of the results much statistical credibility. 
These results confirm the hypothesis put forth in the method section and also give answer to 
the research question posed in the beginning of the essay. According to these results joining 
NATO has a negative impact on the volume of arms exported. The results furthermore 
suggest that a country becomes less likely of exporting arms due to joining NATO. 
As for the examination of the effects on arms export generated by both exporter and importer 
being part of NATO, these suggest an increase in volume yet a decrease in probability. This 
means that the volume of arms increases if both parties of an arms purchase are members of 
NATO. The same conditions do however decrease the very likelihood of that purchase 
occurring. These results all confirm the hypothesis; both exporter and importer being part of 
NATO does increase the volume of export yet decreases the probability of export.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This study investigates what effects joining NATO has on the arms export of a country. An 
analysis is also made of how NATO members export arms. More specifically the effect on 
arms exports is evaluated with the condition of both the exporting and importing nation being 
a member of NATO. These studies are carried out by applying a modified version of the 
gravity model to a set of arms trade data spanning the time period of 1992 to 2010. The 
results find that joining NATO has a negative impact both on the volume of a country’s arms 
export and the probability of the country exporting arms at all. Both exporter and importer 
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being a member of NATO has a positive influence on the volume of arms exported, but 
decreases the likelihood of arms being exported.  
 
To interpret the results attention is paid to the incentives behind sustaining an export of arms. 
The theories on arms trade state that a country maintains a domestic arms industry as a way of 
securing supplies to its military defense. But few countries, if any, has enough resources to 
meet the high fixed costs related to developing moderns arms. In order to spread these costs 
and make the industry affordable, arms are therefore exported. The trend in Swedish military 
spending and arms export is a clear example of this. By joining NATO much of the incentive 
to maintain a domestic arms industry does however vanish. A large portion of global arms 
exports originates from NATO members. These have incentives to export to other members 
since arming allies does in effect increase the military capability of the exporter itself. The 
alliance does therefore not only guarantee military assistance in the case of conflict, it also 
generates a much more stable supply of arms. The outcome is that joining NATO decreases 
both the volume and probability of exporting arms. This is in compliance with the results. The 
analysis on how NATO members trade arms with each other corroborate the findings on arms 
export changes when joining NATO.  
 
The econometric results show that if both parties in an arms trade are members of NATO, the 
likelihood of exporting arms decreases. The volume of export does however increase if both 
parties in an arms trade are members of NATO. The oligopolistic nature of the NATO arms 
trade network is assumed to increases the value of those arms deals actually taking place. 
NATO has no official policy on the arms trade of its members. It does however have “a long-
standing commitment to an active policy in arms-control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
(NATO, 2014).” The oligopolistic nature of the NATO arms trade network signifies that few 
actors have influence over the supply of arms within the alliance. These do also wield large 
influence over the global supply of arms. This could be considered desirable to the NATO 
policy makers. With few actors holding a firmer grip around the world supply of arms, it 
becomes easier to control it.  
 
In light of the results and the subsequent discussion, what can be said about the prospects of 
the Swedish arms industry and arms export in the case of Sweden joining NATO? The 
primary question is whether it will prevail under the oligopolistic market forces of the 
alliance. The country counts as the 11th largest exporter of arms during the last 23 years and 
has a broad industrial infrastructure to support the industry. It is therefore more likely to 
benefit trade wise, than not to, by joining NATO. The lowered trade barriers with other 
members of the alliance ought to increase the demand for Swedish arms. It is difficult to 
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speculate in how Sweden joining NATO would affect importers of Swedish arms not 
belonging to the alliance. These volumes are therefore assumed unchanged. The overall 
market effect of Sweden joining NATO would therefore be an increase in exports. But the 
Swedish arms industry is at the mercy of the government. Its purchasers are all sovereign 
states, and its own state decides to whom it may export. Joining NATO therefore has to be 
evaluated from a policy perspective as well.  
 
The military strategic neutrality and a secure supply of arms are consistently used as 
arguments for a continuation of the Swedish arms industry and arms export. But if Sweden 
joins NATO the concept of neutrality will disappear. It is also quite safe to assume that some 
of the top ten arms exporters of the world that are members of NATO will ensure a steady 
supply of arms to Sweden. This would subtract two heavy arguments supporting the existence 
of the country’s arms industry and export. Political will to argue for a continued or increased 
arms export may consequently decrease. The question therefore boils down to the arms export 
policy Sweden chooses to adopt as a NATO member. Two heavy arguments supporting the 
export and industry, neutrality and supply, dissolve with the membership. Other forces are 
also at play though when it comes to the policymaking. Public opinion in favor of the arms 
industry and its export may, due to the loss of arguments, decrease. At the same time 
disarming the industry would render large economic disadvantages to some regions of the 
country. This could create public upset among parts of the population. Policymakers are 
likely to find themselves facing a dilemma similar to the current situation. Joining NATO 
would however weaken the cause for sustaining the Swedish industry and its export of arms.  
 
This study has looked at panel data for the time period 1992-2014. During these years 12 
countries joined NATO. This means the change in arms export has been possible to observe 
for these 12 countries. All of these 12 countries were historically part of the East during the 
Cold War. The selection may therefore not be very representative when assessing the 
expected effects on arms trade when joining NATO for western European countries like 
Sweden or Finland. Moreover most of the studied countries do not have a large arms export 
or any export at all. The export of a country with a large arms industry, such as Sweden, may 
behave differently when the country joins NATO. The range of observable countries could 
consequently be considered a shortcoming in the study. Although the results of the study 
would not reflect reality better did the data set range further back into time, extending the data 
forward in time would definitely give more precise results. It was in this study merely due to 
an unfortunate shortcoming of GDP-data that the years beyond 2010 could not be included.  
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